The significance of preventing accidents In a construction industry

The signifi posteriorce of pr compositors caseing hazards In a construction industryToday, nigh of the top managers, contractors and organizeers, who work in construction industry, argon aw argon most the signifi stinkpotce of pr endant roleing mishap.( In incident they know that ignoring safeguard and health git impose a high penalty on a comp either -large or small. Also individual incident or daub can think compensation, duration off and lost production and what hold in seemed to be a minor risk becomes a major(ip) liability)( sentry go at work/compiled by Badrie Abdullah/p.iii). Therefore they know the valuable of occupational natural rubber and health circumspection (OSH), although most of the managers havent enough knowledge about OSH. It factor that they dont know what the OSH is and how they must use it. In this report I try to investigate different part of OSH forethought in compassionateitarian the need for it.IntroductionIn current familys, constr uction misadventure decree have decreased as a result of substantial effort by nearly parties. Increased pressures from OSHA and owners, and increased cost of diagonals raised the contractors awareness. In turn, contractors increased gum elastic training and enforcement. These efforts have decline the injury and unwellness rate from 12.2 in 1993 to 7.9 in 2001.The recent attack to hazard forecloseion is base on OSHAs violations approach and steeringes on prescribing and enforcing defenses that is, physical and procedural barriers that dilute the workers exposure to hazards. The violations of the defenses are called unsafe conditions and unsafe carriages. (Systems computer simulation of Construction fortuity Causation /Panagiotis Mitropoulos1 Tariq S. Abdelhamid2 and Gregory A. Howell3.p.12)Only knowing about the benefits of OSH care isnt enough, we must be act and rehearse it. So at archetypal its important to project the necessity of OSH perplexity then defin ition of OSH circumspection and finally how we can follow its rules to make our workplace safe.Who are included in the caoutchouc value kitchen stove?Maybe, it s better to ask this hobbyion who should be interested in misadventure reason and safety trunk?In fact the safety value chain includes students, researchers, technicians, system designers, operators, managers, shareholders, disaster investigators and safety inspectors. (Fig.1), all these groups affect to system safety in different fourth dimension-scale. Educators and researchers add important role in this safety value chain, because educators by article of faith safety culture can help students to have awareness in the first place they enter to workplace and they impact on chance prevention in long term. recourse levelsShort- term Medium-term Long-term regulativeAccident investigators, safety inspectors, and regulators(Penalties)Economic(Incentives)InsurersshareholdersOrganizational/ Managers and comp either ex ecutivesManagerialOperational/ Technicians and system designers tutelageTechnical/ Engineers and system designersDesignResearch researchers and academicsEducation studentsFig 1.safety levers and shareholders in the safety value chainAccident theories based on yearNO moldingsyear1 domino TheoryHeinrich19312Multi perfunctory ModelGordon19413Critical Incident techniqueFlanagan19544 compounding of brokers ModelSchulzinger19565Goals Freedom Alertness TheoryKerr19576 heftiness Exchange ModelHaddon et al19647Decision ModelSurryIn Viner19691991a8Behavioral MethodsHale HaleAnderson et al197019789 faulting head analytic thinking IIMeisterHoys Zimolong1971198810Error ModelWigglesworth197211Life Change Unit ModelAlkov197212luck postman ModelSkibaHoys Zimolong1973198813Task-Demand ModelWaller Klein197314Multilinear issuings Sequencing ModelBanner197515Systems caoutchouc AnalysisSmillie Ayoub197616 take chances Estimation ModelRowe197717Danger response ModelHale Prusse197718Inciden tal Factor Analysis ModelLeplat197819Accident Sequence ModelRamseyQuoted in Sanders McCormick Ramsey19781987198520Psychological ModelCorlett Gilbank198721Domino/ push button wash upZabetakis, quoted in Heinrich et al198022Stair Step ModelDouglas, quoted in Heinrich et al198023Motivation Reward Satisfaction ModelPetersen, quoted in Heinrich et al198024Energy ModelBall, quoted in Heinrich et al198025Systems ModelFirenze, quoted in Heinrich et al198026Epidemiological ModelSuchman, quoted in Heinrich et al198027Updated Domino ModelBird Jr, quoted in Heinrich et al198028Updated Domino ModelAdams, quoted in Heinrich et al198029Updated Domino Model IIWeaver, quoted in Heinrich et al198030Task qualification ModelDrury Brill198031OARU ModelKjellen HovdenKjellen Larsson198132Traffic Conflicts TechniqueZimolong198233Signals Passed at Danger Decision manoeuvre ModelTaylor, R. K. and Lucas, D.A in ch.8 of Van Der Schaaf , Lucas Hale199134Ergonomic Behavioral MethodsKjellen198435 kind-h earted Causation ModelMager Pipe198436Near Accidents IncidentsSwain198537Behavior ModelRasmussen198638Contributing Factors ModelSanders Shaw198739Hazard Carrier ModelHayos Zimolong198840Comet ModelBoylston199041Comprehensive merciful Factors ModelDejoy199042View of Workers on sentry duty Decisions ModelSaari199043Epidemiological ModelKriebel, quoted in C superstar et al199044 ein truthday ModelMcClay199045Federation of Accident Insurance Institution(Finland)ModelSeppanen199746 enquiry Tree ModelHale et al.in Van Der Schaaf, Lucas Hale199147 feature Con place Process ModelViner1991b48Onward Mappings Model based on Resident Pathogens Metaphor movement199149Functional Levels ModelHurst et al199250Tripod TreeWheelahan199451Attribution Theory ModelDejoy199452Cindynic HyperspaceKervern199553Fig.2 Accident theories (Enhancing Occupational Safety and Health, Geofry Taylor, Kellie Easter, Roy Hegney)2004What is occupational safety and control?The Occupational Safety and Health manage ment is a management which provides the legislative framework to secure the safety, health and welfare among all workforces and to harbor new(prenominal)s against risks to safety or health in connection with the activities of persons at work.( line of descent Seeker Handbook/alaysian Labour Law Regulation of Employment)Occupational health and safety is a discipline with a broad scope involving umteen specialized fields. In its broadest gumption, it should aim atthe promotion and maintenance of the highest full stop of physical, mental and social eudaemonia of workers in all occupationsthe prevention among workers of adverse effects on health ca utilize by their working conditionsThe protection of workers in their employment from risks resulting from factors adverse to healthThe placing and maintenance of workers in an occupational environs adapted to physical and mental needsThe adaptation of work to gentlekinds.In early(a) words, occupational health and safety encompasse s thesocial, mental and physical well-being of workers that is the whole person. (Website of InternationalLabor formation)What is an accident?It is necessary to define what we mean by the word accident, because before anyone can begin to put up any sort of a fledge, he must know his enemy. So we must do the same.An accident is an ad hoc event, which could result in injury to persons or in damage to plant and equipment or both. Also accidents are consequent of unplanned (unsafe) acts or unplanned (unsafe) conditions performed or created by people. In fact people cause accidents, by what they do or what they default to do and the activity of people, in a factory or any other place of work, are controlled by management. (a safe place of work/D.WB James/p.56)From the linguistic point of view, the word accident is the present participle of the Latin verb accident which means to happen, which in turn is derived from ad- + cadere, meaning to fall. The real meaning of accident is ther efore that of a fall or stumble. The line from to fall is significant, since falling is not something one dose on purpose. If soulfulness falls while walking or while climbing, it is decidedly an unanticipated and unwanted event. It is, in other words, what we call an accident an unforeseen and unplanned event, which leads to some sort of passing play or injury. separate definitions of accident , much(prenominal) as they can be found in various dictionaries, obtain that an accident is an unforeseen and unplanned event or circumstance that (1) happens unpredictably without discernible human intention or observable cause and (2) leads to loss or injury. Used as an adverb, to say that something happens accidently or happens by accident means that it happens by chance. (Barriers and Accident Prevention/Erik Hollnagel p.34/2005)The need for accident modelsIt is a truism that we cannot think about something without having the words and fancys to quarter it, or without having some frame of reference. The advantage of having a common frame of reference is that conference and understanding become more(prenominal)(prenominal) efficient, because a number of things can be taken for granted. The frame of reference is particularly important in cerebration about accidents, because it determines how we view the role of gentleman. (Barriers and Accident Prevention/Erik Hollnagel p.4445/2005)Accident spring models attend 2.Diagram showing the dominate five perceptual experiences of accident occasion (Benner 1975).The single event imageSINGLE EVENT CONCEPTWhat the first opinion of accident causation is the Single Event Concept. This idea concentrates that a single event caused accident. It means that this simple model is the across-the-boardstThe first perception of accident causation is the single event judgment. This concept focuses on the laying claim that accidents are caused by a single event. This simple model exemplifies the quest for the cause of wh at occurred. The search for a scapegoat and taking care of the scapegoat would solve the problem. This concept is the most widely perceived and least complex. The public and media typically utilize this concept when they ask what caused the accident?LimitationsThe single events concept is limited in its ability to see the accident as a butt on or date of events in time. The factors that whitethorn direct to the accident are not identified or pursued due to the fact that the real cause is obvious and visible. Causes that may underline human behavior are rarely determined.ApplicationCurrent applications are in general observable in how the public and media view accidents. This viewpoint is reinforced by findings much(prenominal) as when an airline accident was caused by pilot misconduct. Police citations are another sheath of the perception.CHAIN OF EVENTS CONCEPTHistoryThe chain of events concept or domino theory was originally discloseed by Heinrich (1941). The base conce pt implied that accidents resulted from a epoch of events that led to an accident. Like a course of dominos, once the chronological sequence began each event led to the next until an accident occurred. Intervention at any point along the events sequence could verification the accident carry out and eliminate the unwanted results. An unsafe act starts the chain of events that began with an unsafe condition.LimitationsThis concept is limited by the linear progression character of the model. Interactions among events, contributing causes, and the duration and timing of each event limit the acknowledgment of all causal factors.ApplicationsThe current use of this concept is prevalent in the legal field that attempts to reconstruct the sequence of events that led to the accident.2.the determinat variable concept3.the domino theory4.the fault guide uninflected methodology duty period TREE ANALYSISHeinrich (1941) create the methodology that preceded and formed the basis for reces s Tree Analysis. He illustrated the linear sequence of factors in accident causation by using a domino theory. The theory stated that a disturbance that caused any one of the five identified components of the sequence to shop would set off a chain-of-events that led to an accident. The five in the sequence were 1) ancestry and social environment, 2) conditions and fault of person, 3) unsafe act, 4) unsafe condition and 5) injury. He showed that by intervention at any point along the sequence an accident/injury could be prevented. This theory has been modified and updated (Baker 1953, Marcum 1978, Heinrich et al 1980), and has wide applicability in current automobile accident and law enforcement investigatings. similar linear sequence models such as Critical Path Analysis (CPA), Gantt Charts, and Program Evaluation Research Task (PERT), were initially used in the 1950s and 60s as planning tools (Lockyer 1964). Though many names were assumption to their wait on they were very simi lar in their goals and methods. They provided a graphical pompousness of activities linked to events by arrows in order to plan complex projects. The process illustrated a flow (path) from one depute sequence to the next and combine time frames and interrelationships between tasks. Projects could then be analyzed by task, the mensuration of time needed for each segment and the relationship a task may have with another task. These methods offered an effective means of project planning, cost analysis, and time frame considerations by visually outlining the task process (Lockyer 1964). These processes as well as provided the means to better understand the interrelationships between and among tasks. This logical depiction of process flow related directly to analyzing an accident sequence and the precursor events.In the 1960s buzzer Laboratories expanded upon the linear chain of events concept through and through missile system safety. They arranged events in a flow chart that use d a proceed/follow logic pattern. Their concept, open frame Tree Analysis (Figure 11), is generally credited to Watson (1971). Figure 12 illustrates the fault head concept as applied to a hypothetical accident where a wildland firefighter was burned. This analysis concept helped provide a sense of management by objectives by identifying unwanted events (the top event) and then systematically and consecutive determining the precursor events. The objective is the top event and the identification of the antecedent causal factors aid in the management achievement of that objective. Watsons Fault Tree Analysis investigation methodology provided a visible, easily understood and defendable format (1971). The methodology extended the linear chain of events into a ramose events chains concept through the use of and/or logic gates. It uses radical Boolean logic in a hierarchical tree format. Other Boolean terms such as not are not used in Fault Tree Analysis. For example, C can just occ ur when both AandB occur. If two or more events are required for a cause to happen then an and emblem is used. Another possibility is when only one of the factors need be present. For C to occur, then AorB occurred. If only one event of two or more are necessary then an or gate is used. The top event is the unwanted result of the accident and causal factors branch out below leading to it. The drink downward sequence is proceed until the root causes are found or the tree cannot be foster genuine. This technique, according to Benner (1975), contributed a powerful tool for the investigation of accidents both diachronic and postulated. Accidents could be investigated or reinvestigated in the search for causal factors utilizing this method. It assisted in illuminating areas that may have previously been overlooked by other means. Numerous approaches to determining accident causal factor using double events chains reflected the discipline of the investigations employing it thus me dical doctorsused an epidemiological approach (agent/host/environment), while psychologists rivet on human factors.Figure 11. Fault Tree diagram illustrating a typical failure process, symbols used,and the logic sequence leading to an undesired event, a dark room (in Ferry 1988).Figure 12. Fault Tree diagram illustrating the deductive process using an example of a sequence of events in which a firefighter receives burns.One pick out limitation of Fault Tree Analysis is the inability to model time sequences that are concurrent and interactive (Hendrick and Benner 1987). Brown (1993) added that only one event could be analyzed at a time and thus primarily applicable to catastrophic events. Benner (1975) cited similar deficiencies, most notably that charting analysis methods focus on a single undesired event and provided no means to indicate the chronological relationships (and the ulterior concurrent interrelationships) of events. Another limitation is the barricade inherent in th e method whereby causes must be either successes or failures and degrees of each are not accounted for (Tulsiani and others 1990).5.the energy-barriers-targets modelBarriers AnalysisBarriers Analysis is an accident investigation method that is an additional component of the MORT process. The method identifies barriers/controls that are in place to prevent accidents. These barriers may be physical and/or administrative and must be absent, inadequate, or bypassed in order for the accident to occur. A more detailed account of this approach allow be undertaken in the methods section as this method is one of the USDA proposed investigative tools (USDA 1998).6.the management oversight and risk treeHistoryTraditional accident investigations pore on the active response to a mishap and the identification of physical processs to prevent future occurrences. The degree and intensity of the accident dictated the intensity of the investigation response and subsequent preventative action (Brown 1993). But as engineering science advanced and systems became more complex, the consequences of accidents became increasingly un accommodateable to society and industry, particularly in the nuclear power industry. The nuclear industry and similar high-risk technologies have determined that learning from accidents and even near misses was not an option. The consequences of accidents precluded the traditional tribulation by error approach where as accidents occurred the problem was fixed subsequent to the next mishap (termed the fly-fix-fly approach). A new approach was undertaken to become proactive as well as reactive in accident analysis techniques to determine possible failure points prior to occurrence. Johnson (1973a) working for the National Safety Council and under a contract from the US Atomic Energy counsel focused on a systems approach to accident analysis. This approach focused on the entire system in which accidents occurred and the interaction of events at heart tha t system. Johnson coordinated two basic views to focus on management responsibility in planning the context in which accidents occur. These views, understanding the energy release process and focusing management of that hazard on the route of its release, led Johnson to develop the concept of less than adequate management decisions. This progressed to the Management Oversight and Risk Tree (MORT) accident analysis tool. He said MORT was an analytical procedure that provides a disciplined approach for finding the causes and contributing factors of mishaps. It entailed a very broad and detailed checklist that facilitated the search for safety problems. It incorporated 1500 possible causes and 98 generic problems and was the initial methodology to embody management oversight into accident causation. The Department of Energy currently employs this method as one of its most comprehensive analytical techniques (DOE 1992). It is more generally used as a proactive method in safety system e valuations than as an accident investigation method. This is primarily due to the fact that it can be time consuming and intensive and due to the nature of the nuclear industry, identifying possible loopholes in the safety system to eliminate hazards is more cost effective and publicly expedient than after the accident occurs.This concept was highly visible, easily reviewed and updated as new relevant facts warrant, and provided structure to help reduce overlooked factors and bias. inwardly the MORT system incidents were defined as inadequate barrier/controls or as failures without consequence. Accidents resulted in adverse consequences. The MORT system incorporated the concept of the unwanted imparting of energy that can cause mishaps due to inadequate barriers/controls. These barriers and controls may be physical (protective clothing, concrete walls, etc) or administrative (codes, standards and regulations). The MORT system is based on two main sources of accidental losses 1) sp ecific job oversights and omissions and 2) the management system factors that control the job (Johnson 1973a). A third source he mentioned was assumed risk. Johnson noted that once this source was decent evaluated it could not be considered accidental in nature since we have consciously decided to accept the risk. Integral aspects of the MORT process are Fault Tree Analysis, Barriers Analysis and Event and Causal Factors Charting. Each of these approaches will be subsequently explained.LimitationsLimitations of MORT are that it can be insufficient in finding specific causes as it intentional to identify general causal areas (Gertman and Blackman 1994). These authors do recognize its strengths in identifying more specific control and managerial factors. Moreover, this systematic process is advantageous when system experts are not available.ApplicationIts current use as a proactive safety system analysis tool for the Department of Energy has long standing (Briscoe 1990). It has been used exclusively as both a proactive technique and an accident investigation method for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.7.petersens multiple causation model8.reasons swiss cheating model of human error 1990Reasons Swiss Cheese Model of world ErrorOne particularly appealing approach to the genesis of human error is the one proposed by James Reason (1990). Generally referred to as the Swiss cheese model of human error, Reason describes four levels of human failure, each influencing the next (Figure 1). Working backwards in time from the accident, the first level depicts thoseUnsafe Actsof Operators that lastly led to the accident1. More commonly referred to in aviation as air crew/pilot error, this level is where most accident investigations have focused their efforts and consequently, where most causal factors are uncovered. After all, it is typically the actions or inactions of aircrew that are directly linked to the accident. For instance, failing to properly scan the aircraft s instruments while in instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) or peachy IMC when authorized only for visual meteorological conditions (VMC) may yield relatively immediate, and potentially grave, consequences. Represented as holes in the cheese, these active failures are typically the last unsafe acts committed by aircrew.1Reasons original work manifold operators of a nuclear power plant. However, for the purposes of this manuscript, the operators here refer to aircrew, maintainers, supervisors and other humans involved in aviation.However, what makes the Swiss cheese model particularly reusable in accident investigation, is that it forces investigators to address latent failures within the causal sequence of events as well. As their name suggests, latent failures, unlike their active counterparts, may lie dormant or undetected for hours, days, weeks, or even longer, until one day they adversely affect the unsuspecting aircrew. Consequently, they may be overlooked by investig ators with even the best intentions.Within this concept of latent failures, Reason described three more levels of human failure. The first involves the condition of the aircrew as it affects transaction. Referred to asPreconditions for Unsafe Acts, this level involves conditions such as mental scare off and poor communication and coordination practices, often referred to as crew resource management (CRM). Not surprising, if fatigued aircrew fail to communicate and coordinate their activities with others in the cockpit or individuals external to the aircraft (e.g., air traffic control, maintenance, etc.), poor decisions are do and errors often result.Figure 1. The Swiss cheese model of human error causation (adapted from Reason, 1990).But exactly why did communication and coordination break down in the first place? This is perhaps where Reasons work departed from more traditional approaches to human error. In many instances, the breakdown in slap-up CRM practices can be traced ba ck to instances ofUnsafe Supervision, the third level of human failure. If, for example, two inexperienced (and perhaps even below average pilots) are paired with each other and sent on a public life into known adverse weather at night, is anyone really surprised by a tragic outcome? To make matters worse, if this questionable manning practice is conjugated with the lack of quality CRM training, the potential for miscommunication and ultimately, aircrew errors, is magnified. In a sense then, the crew was set up for failure as crew coordination and ultimately performance would be compromised. This is not to lessen the role played by the aircrew, only that intervention and mitigation strategies might lie higher within the system.Reasons model didnt stop at the supervisory level either the organization itself can impact performance at all levels. For instance, in times of fiscal austerity, funding is often cut, and as a result, training and flight time are curtailed. Consequently, s upervisors are often left with no resource but to task non-proficient aviators with complex tasks. Not surprisingly then, in the absence seizure of good CRM training, communication and coordination failures will begin to appear as will a myriad of other preconditions, all of which will affect performance and elicit aircrew errors. Therefore, it makes sense that, if the accident rate is going to be reduced beyond current levels, investigators and analysts alike must examine the accident sequence in its entirety and expand it beyond the cockpit. Ultimately, causal factors at all levels within the organization must be addressed if any accident investigation and prevention system is going to succeed.In many ways, Reasons Swiss cheese model of accident causation has revolutionized common views of accident causation. Unfortunately, however, it is simply a theory with few details on how to apply it in a real-world setting. In other words, the theory never defines what the holes in the che ese really are, at least within the context of universal operations. Ultimately, one needs to know what these system failures or holes are, so that they can be identified during accident investigations or better yet, detected and change by reversal before an accident occurs.The balance of this paper will attempt to describe the holes in the cheese. However, rather than attempt to define the holes using esoteric theories with unretentive or no practical applicability, the original framework (called theTaxonomy of Unsafe Operations) was developed using over 300 Naval aviation accidents obtained from the U.S. Naval Safety Center (Shappell Wiegmann, 1997a). The original taxonomy has since been refined using input and data from other military (U.S. Army Safety Center and the U.S. Air Force Safety Center) and civilian organizations (National Transportation Safety Board and the Federal Aviation Administration). The result was the development of the Human Factors Analysis and Classifica tion System (HFACS).1.2. Accident investigation methodsDuring the last decades, a number of methods for accident investigation have been developed and described in the literature.The selection of methods for the needs of our study was made on the basis that they are described in the literature, they show the evolution of accident investigation over time and they are either widely used or recently developed. Based on these criteria, the following methods were selected1.2.1. Fault tree analysis (FTA)FTA was developed in the early 1960s by the Bell Laboratories (Ferry, 1988). In FTA, an undesired event (an accident) is selected and all the possible things that can contribute to the event are diagrammed as a tree in order to show logical connections and causes leading to a specified accident. FTA is more an analytical tool for establishing relations it does not give the i